Civil-katonai kapcsolatok és a haderő demokratikus

kontrollja a független Szlovéniában és Horvátországban (1991-2011) by Harangozó, Dániel
  
 
 
Doctoral Program in 
Political Science  
 
 
 
 
SUMMARY 
 
 
 
 
Daniel Harangozo  
 
Civil-military relations and democratic control of the armed forces in 
independent Slovenia and Croatia (1991-2011) 
 
Ph.D. thesis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Supervisor: 
 
Sandor Gallai, PhD 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Budapest, 2018 
  
2 
 
Table of contents 
 
I. Main concepts and research questions .................................................................................... 3 
II. Analytical framework and methodology ............................................................................... 5 
III. Main findings ....................................................................................................................... 8 
IV. References .......................................................................................................................... 17 
V. Author’s publications related to the topic ........................................................................... 20 
 
  
3 
 
I. Main concepts and research questions 
 
Political control over the military is one of the oldest problems in the world of politics, but the 
question of “who guards the guardians?” is relevant in modern times as well.  
Relations between armed forces and politics played a key role in the democratic transitions of 
the second half of XX century, like those in Southern Europe and Latin America. (Agüero 1995, 
3-6). As opposed to those two regions where the role of armed forces was crucial in the process 
of democratic transition, the military was a rather passive “spectator” during the collapse of 
single-party systems in Central and Eastern Europe (Barany 1993, 155-157).  
But that passivity does not mean that there were no unique challenges in this region regarding 
the relations between armed forces and politics. In the party-state systems the armed forces 
were under civilian control, but that control was by no means democratic: one of the main tasks 
of the army was the defense of Party rule, and the Party had an institutional presence in the 
army via party cells. (Barany 1993, 10-11).  
As pointed out by Zoltan D. Barany (2012, 222), while in democratic transitions the main 
challenge was “demilitarization of politics”, in the post-Communist transition the 
“depolitization of the military” was the main task. These challenges were complemented in the 
newly established states, like successor states of the former Yugoslavia, with the problems of 
state-building, and thus, army-building as well (Barany 2012, 225-226). 
In my PhD thesis I analyze the evolution of civil-military relations and the development of 
democratic control over the armed forces1 in Slovenia and Croatia, two successor states of the 
former Yugoslavia, during the first twenty years of their existence as independent states. 
One of the conceptual “frames” of the dissertation is the process of state-building and military-
building, and its relationship with the main question mentioned above. A further aim is the 
assessment of explaining factors which may have influenced civil-military relations and the 
democratic control over the armed forces during the period under analysis.  
Upon designing the research, I posed four research questions in relation with the two countries:  
1./ How did the Yugoslav political-historical legacy influence army-building, as a particular 
area of state-building?  
                                                          
1 In my dissertation by „armed forces” or „military” I understand the regular armed forces of the two countries 
concerned, excluding, where applicable, any paramilitary or irregular armed formations. I will likewise exclude 
from my analysis law-enforcement organizations like the police, border guards, as well as the intelligence and 
security services.  
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2./ What effect did the differing duration and intensity of armed conflict, experienced by the 
two countries, have on civil-military relations and the democratic control of the armed forces?  
3./ What role did the different political setting in the two countries during the 1990s (absence 
or presence of democratic deficit) play in the evolution of civil-military relations and 
establishment of democratic control over the armed forces?  
4./ What was the effect of the different perspectives of Euro-Atlantic integration in the two 
countries concerned on civil-military relations and the reform of defense sector? 
One of the key concepts of the thesis, civil-military relations, can be interpreted in different 
ways (Nelson 2002, 161).  According to the “narrow” interpretations, as used by classical 
authors of the field, like Huntington (1957) and Janowitz (1960), by civil-military relations we 
understand the relationship between the political and military leaders.  There is also a “broad” 
interpretation of the concept (see for example Born et al. 2006, 4-5, and Cottey et al. 2002, 6), 
according to which civil-military relations can be defined as the interaction between the armed 
forces as a social institution and the society as a whole. In my PhD thesis, generally I will build 
upon the former, “narrow” interpretation.  
With regards to control, we need to distinguish between “civilian” and “democratic” control 
over the armed forces. Democratic control of the armed forces is the key element of civil-
military relations in liberal democratic states. According to Cottey et al (2002, 6) democratic 
control of the armed forces can be defined as “political control of the military by the legitimate, 
democratically elected authorities of the state”. 
While democratic control is necessarily civilian control, not all forms of civilian control are 
democratic. Militaries in the former party-state systems in Central and Eastern Europe were 
under firm civilian control, but this was the political control of the Communist Party, which 
was underpinned by, among others, institutional presence of the party in the armed forces, party 
membership of large part of the officer corps, participation of certain members of the military 
elite in Party executive bodies (like the Central Committee), and intensive political 
indoctrination of the officers and soldiers (Gow 1992, 28-29).  
The nature of civilian control over the armed forces under Communism also did influence the 
challenges during the transition: a transition between two modes of civilian control, from 
Communist (one-party) civilian control to democratic civilian control had to take place (Cottey 
et al. 2002, 3-4).  
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II. Analytical framework and methodology 
 
Building on the research questions mentioned in Part I, upon reviewing the relevant literature I 
defined four explaining factors:  
1./ Historical legacy: previous historical experiences (or the dominant perception thereof in the 
given countries) can play a considerable role in policy processes of the field of defense and 
security and the question of civil-military relations. Those experiences can include the presence 
or absence of independent state traditions, previous military traditions of the given people or 
nation, or historical social attitudes regarding armed forces and military (Vankovska and 
Wiberg 2003, 39-40, Edmunds, Forster, and Cottey 2003, 249, Nelson 2002b, 427-428).  
In case of Slovenia and Croatia my analysis does include the role of the Yugoslav historical and 
political legacy in general, and civil-military relations in the Titoist period as well as the post-
1968 Yugoslav military doctrine, called All-People’s Defense, in particular.  
2./ Armed conflict and threat perceptions: in the literature we can find classical examples on 
theorizing the relationship between security threat and civilian control of the armed forces. 
According to Harold Lasswell (1941) the strong external threat to the state leads to the 
weakening of civilian control: this is the “garrison state” hypothesis. As opposed to Lasswell, 
Stanislav Andreski (1954) posits that the lack of external threat, and therefore the “idleness” of 
the military leads to weakening control by the civilian authorities. (Desch 1996, 12-13, Desch 
1999, 1-2). The structural realist model proposed by Michael C. Desch treats internal and 
external threats separately when assessing their effect on civilian control (Desch 1999, 11-13). 
3./ Internal political processes: democratic control of the armed forces and existence of a 
democratic political system necessitate each other, as the successful operation of a democratic 
state presupposes democratic control of the entities entrusted with exercising the legitimate 
monopoly of violence of the state (Vankovska and Wiberg 2003, 3-4, Cottey et al. 2002b, 262-
263). On the other hand, even if institutional and political conditions of democratic control are 
provided for, “politicization” or use of the armed forces for party-political purposes by civilian 
politicians can still present a problem (Huntington 1996, 11, Born et al 2006b, 244-246, 253, 
Bland 1995). When assessing the effect of this factor I took into account the democratic or 
authoritarian nature of political power in each country, and whether security or defense issues 
did become “politicized”, or in other words, did became subject of intense political or 
ideological debates or controversies. 
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4./ International actors and organizations: in my work I considered the role of NATO, and, in 
some cases, the European Union, and I aimed to find out the degree of their influence on policy- 
and decision-making in the field of military and defense. In case of the UN arms embargo on 
the successor states of the former Yugoslavia and Croatia’s bilateral defense cooperation during 
the 1990s I also took into account the effect of international actors different from the two 
organizations mentioned above.  
The twenty-year time-span was divided into four multi-year periods in case of both countries, 
and I assessed the effect of the explaining factors already introduced on a four-point scale for 
each period and each country. In doing this I aimed to establish the extent at which the given 
factor was able to influence the main trends of civil-military relations during the given period. 
 The effect was declared “insignificant”, if the given factor did not have any effect, or 
that effect was not relevant for the topic in question 
 I consider the effect “discernible” if the factor did have effect on the processes in 
question but that effect was limited 
 If the given factor played an important role in the processes I study, but it wasn’t the 
principal explaining factor in the given period, its effect is declared “considerable” 
 Finally, the effect was deemed “decisive”, if in the given period the processes in 
question were principally to be explained by the given factor  
 
The thesis combines approaches from political science, military science and international 
relations, in line with the interdisciplinary nature of the field of civil-military relations (Olmeda 
2013, 62-63). It addresses a gap in the literature by analyzing the problem of civil-military 
relations and democratic control of armed forces in a comparative setting and with multiple 
explaining factors. In case of the external determinants, my analysis is not limited to the 
influence of international organizations, but I also consider the impact of armed conflict and 
security threat perceptions. In the international scholarly literature there is a relative paucity of 
comparative studies in the field of civil-military relations (Olmeda 2013, 68), and in Hungarian 
literature in general little attention is paid to this issue as well as military and defense affairs of 
neighboring Yugoslav successor states.  
From a methodological standpoint the thesis project has two goals. First, I wanted to explore 
and analyze the evolution and main trends of civil-military relations and the establishment of 
democratic control over the armed forces in the two countries concerned. In that respect, my 
research is idiographic or atheoretical (Lijphart 1971).  
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On the other hand, I also assessed the effect of four explaining factors on the policy areas 
included in the analysis, therefore, aiming to provide an explanation on the main “drivers” of 
policy processes in these areas.  
The thesis belongs to the category of qualitative comparative case studies, using structured 
focused comparison (George and Bennett 2005, 67-73) and process tracing (Beach and 
Pedersen 2013) as its main methods.  
During the research phase of the thesis project I did review the secondary sources related to the 
subject in English and Hungarian, including, where possible, literature in Croatian and 
Slovenian as well. Secondary sources were complemented by relevant legislation from both 
countries (laws, regulations, internal orders), as well as ministry documents (such as annual 
reports). Apart from the sources mentioned above I also conducted several interviews with 
security and defense policy experts and two former defense ministers of Slovenia. 
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III. Main findings 
 
In Slovenia at the end of June 1991 a brief, ten-day armed conflict took place between armed 
units under control of the Slovenian government and units of the Yugoslav People’s Army 
(YPA) which ended with a cease-fire on terms favorable to Slovenia (Szilágyi 2002, 40-43, 
Gow and Carmichael 2000, 177-181). The Slovenian forces which took part in the conflict were 
established by the Slovenian government in 1990-1991, based on the Territorial Defense Forces 
(TDF), which was a component of the post-1968 Yugoslav defense system, nominally under 
control of the constituent republics of Yugoslavia (Horncastle 2013). That institutional legacy 
of the Territorial Defense, along with the heterogeneous composition of the officer corps of the 
Slovenian Army (presence of former TDF officers in the military leadership), and experiences 
of the 1991 war did influence during the 1990s the development of the Slovenian armed forces 
and civil-military relations (Malesic and Jelusic 2005, 211-212, Jelusic 2017, Kopac 2017).  
The Yugoslav historical legacy did play a role in “negative” form as well.  
Some solutions in the new Slovenian defense system were instituted to show a “clean break” 
with the former Yugoslav practice, such as the very liberal provisions on conscientious 
objection to military service (Jelusic 2002, 114-115). Likewise, it can also be interpreted as a 
reaction to Yugoslav practices that the defense sector, particularly during the 1990s, was 
dominated by civilians (Bebler 2004, 128-130, Furlan 2013, 443).  
Since the end of that decade, the role of historical legacies diminished significantly, but did not 
disappear completely as it can be evidenced by the survival of pacifist social attitudes in some 
form (Svete 2011, Bebler and Jazbec 2010, 55). 
As, apart from the “ten-day war”, the country did not participate in the Yugoslav Wars of the 
1990s, the role of armed conflict and threat perceptions is discernible only in the initial 
periods, in particular until the conclusion of the wars in Croatia and Bosnia in 1995 (Vankovska 
1995, 219-220). For the 2000s, conventional security threats lost their importance for 
policymakers and the public opinion, as shown by strategic documents adopted in this period 
(such as the National Security Strategy: ReSNV 2001, 3.2-3.3.) emphasizing non-traditional 
threats, as well as opinion polls (see for example Kotnik and Kopac 2002, 156-157).  
Due to challenges related to state-building and intense political debates and controversies 
concerning security and defense policy (such as political affairs related to defense minister 
Janez Janša, as well as disputes on competences between the defense minister and the president) 
in the first period the internal political processes played a decisive role in the evolution of 
civil-military relations in Slovenia (Malesic 2006, 131-132, 143, Bebler 1996, 209-210).  
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At the same time, impact of international actors and organizations was insignificant, as 
institutional contacts with NATO were established only at the end of the period (in 1993-1994), 
during this time the effect of the UN arms embargo was the most discernible (Kopac 2017, 
Szilágyi 2002, 63-64).  
The effect of internal political processes remained important during the period from 1994 to 
2000 as well. Frequent ministerial changes at the Ministry of Defense and lack of policy 
continuity hampered long term strategic planning, with negative consequences for Slovenia’s 
NATO bid (Malesic 2017, Jelusic 2002, 118-119, Vankovska and Wiberg 2003, 177-178).  
Despite that a consensus was formed in the Slovenian political elites on the need of NATO 
membership as soon as in 1994, membership did not materialize during the 1990s due to both 
external and internal reasons (Szilágyi 2002, 79-83). Even so, effect of international 
organizations, mainly NATO, became stronger during 1994-2000 on the field in question, 
particularly towards the end of the period when preparations for NATO membership were 
intensified and the country became a participant in NATO’s Membership Action Plan (MAP).  
NATO had the strongest effect on the field in question during the period between 2000 and 
2004 (Kopac 2017). In this period internal political “will” to fulfil the conditions of NATO 
membership (expert minister leading the MoD, policy continuity, strategic policy and decision-
making) was “met” by credible membership perspective as well as structured and 
institutionalized forms of pre-accession assistance (such as the Membership Action Plan) from 
the NATO side (Malesic et al. 2015, 12-14, Kopac 2017).  
Strong impact of NATO in this policy area somewhat decreased after joining the organization, 
but remained considerable, as NATO defense planning rules and structures were introduced, 
and capability development decisions were influenced by the need of foreign military 
deployments on NATO-led missions. Intense political and social debates on military 
deployments in Afghanistan (Malesic et al. 2015, 119-120, 129-130), and a corruption scandal 
linked to the procurement of armored combat vehicles, the “Patria” affair (Furlan 2013, 448-
449), show that internal political processes still had a considerable effect in the policy area 
concerned.  
Effects of the explaining factors in the Slovenian case are shown on Table 1. 
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Table 1: Effect of the explaining factors in the Slovenian case 
 
Period and 
examples 
HISTORICAL 
LEGACIES THREAT PERCEPTIONS 
INTERNAL POLITICAL 
PROCESSES INTERNATIONAL ACTORS 
1991-1994 
Considerable Discernible Decisive Discernible 
Experiences of the 
1991 “ten-day” war  
“Clean break” with the 
Yugoslav past  
Institutional legacy of 
the Territorial Defense 
War in Croatia and 
Bosnia, instability in 
the neighborhood 
Effects of the UN arms 
embargo 
Dispute on competences 
between the president 
and the defense minister 
“MORiS” affair 
Scandals related to 
violations of the UN 
arms embargo 
Effects of the UN arms 
embargo 
“Soul searching” in 
security policy 
No NATO membership 
perspective 
1994-2000 
Discernible Discernible Decisive Discernible 
Institutional legacy of 
the Territorial Defense 
1995 military doctrine 
War in Croatia and 
Bosnia until 1995 
Declining importance 
of conventional threats 
from 1995 
Frequent change of 
defense ministers 
Frequent change of 
development priorities 
Lack of strategic 
planning 
NATO membership 
perspective from the 
second half of 1990s 
Participation in NATO 
MAP from 1999 
2000-2004 
Discernible Insignificant Considerable Decisive 
Pacifist social attitudes: 
debate on NATO 
membership 
Non-conventional 
security threats 
Debate on the 
introduction of all-
volunteer force 
Reforms needed for 
NATO membership 
Participation in NATO 
MAP and NATO 
accession process 
High-level personal 
contacts between 
Slovenian and NATO 
actors 
2004-2011 
Discernible Insignificant Considerable Considerable 
Pacifist social attitudes: 
debate on foreign 
military deployments 
(mainly Afghanistan) 
Non-conventional 
security threats 
Debate on foreign 
military deployments 
(mainly Afghanistan) 
“Patria” affair 
Defense expenditure cuts 
Introduction of NATO 
defense planning system 
Increased participation in 
NATO and EU-led 
missions 
 
Source: own work 
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In the Croatian case effect of the Yugoslav historical legacy was stronger and more enduring 
than in Slovenia. Due to the war in 1991-1995 the newly created Croatian Army did incorporate 
a large number of ex-YPA officers of Croatian ethnicity, who played an important role 
particularly in the initial stages of the conflict (Lukic 2008, 194-195, Vankovska and Wiberg 
2003, 180-181, Bebler 1996, 202). Moreover, according to several authors (Domjancic 2015, 
171-172, Lukic 2008, 190-191) patterns of civil-military relations in Titoist Yugoslavia did 
influence the forms of authoritarian or party control of the Croatian military during the Tudjman 
regime. During the 2000s, historical experiences only had a limited impact on the field I analyze 
(Edmunds 2007, 75-76, Tatalovic 2010, 18-19).  
Armed conflict and security threats did have the strongest effect on Croatian civil-military 
relations during the 1990s, as the 1991-95 war had a profound impact on both the political 
process and the internal organization of the military (manpower, structure, modes and 
opportunities for promotion) (Edmunds 2007, 121-124, Bellamy 2002b, 176-177).  
The war situation made possible a certain legitimization of authoritarian methods and 
techniques of governance, and during this period the “political instrumentalization” of the 
armed conflict can also be observed. For example, snap elections were called for October 1995 
by the government, in order to capitalize on the August 1995 victory over the rebel Serbs in 
Croatia and the end of the war (Vankovska 2002, 58-59, 77, Vankovska and Wiberg 2003, 209-
210, Dolenec 2013 138-140). In the 2000s, conventional security threats gradually lost their 
importance for both Croatian policymakers and the public opinion.  
Internal political processes did have the strongest impact on the field in question during the 
nineties as well, as authoritarian forms of civilian control were established during this period. 
(Dolenec 2013, 133-134, 139-140, Bellamy 2002, 176-180). The internal processes conserved 
their importance in shaping Croatian civil-military relations during the period after the “regime 
change” of 2000, due to intense political disagreement inside the centre-left governing 
coalition, along with disputes on competences between the president and the defense minister 
(Edmunds 2007, 59-60, 75). Moreover, defense and the military were one of the 
“battlegrounds” in the heated political confrontation between the centre-left parties and the 
opposition right-leaning HDZ (Edmunds 2003, 41-42, Edmunds 2007, 132-133).  
Those debates and controversies had a negative effect on implementing the reforms necessary 
for NATO membership (part of those related to establishment of democratic civil-military 
relations), therefore the intensification of the reform process can be dated only from 2002 
(Edmunds 2007, 59-60, 132-133). 
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Political debates and controversies concerning the defense sector did decrease somewhat during 
the period 2003-2011, as a fundamental consensus was established on main issues of NATO 
membership between the president and the government, and between and left- and right- wing 
of Croatian politics. Moreover, the center-right coalition led by Ivo Sanader was more unified 
internally than the preceding centre-left cabinet. (Lukic 2008, 205, Simunovic 2015, 182-183, 
Edmunds 2007, 60-61). Nevertheless, intense political debates on the issues relevant for my 
thesis did take place in this period as well, particularly the cooperation with the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) has given rise to these disagreements 
(Edmunds 2007, 198-199, 202-204).  
Impact of international actors of organizations during the 1990s was limited. During the 
1991-1995 war, due to the UN arms embargo, bilateral defense cooperation between Croatia 
and the US did only take place indirectly, through the American private military contractor 
Military Professional Resources, Inc. (MPRI). Owing to the authoritarian nature of the Tudjman 
regime, the country was excluded from Euro-Atlantic integration processes in the second half 
of the 1990s as well, therefore indirect (MPRI) and direct (inter-governmental) bilateral links 
did provide Croatia the only opportunity for defense cooperation during this period (Tatalovic 
2010, 7, Edmunds 2007, 192-193, 198-199).  
Increasing effect of NATO can be observed only in the period after 2000: several strategic 
documents and legislative acts adopted in this period did reflect NATO requirements (Tatalovic 
2010, 9, Pietz and Remillard 2006, 36). That effect intensified even more in the period 2003-
2011, when political will to implement needed reforms for membership was met by credible 
membership perspective from NATO side. In this period the administrative part of NATO 
Headquarters and experts from some NATO member states did assist directly the Croatian 
Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense to prepare strategic documents, and to design and 
implement reforms needed for NATO accession. (Edmunds 2007, 200-201, Simunovic 2015, 
194, Tatalovic 2010, 13). Moreover, participation of Croatian Armed Forces in international 
missions were also motivated by NATO membership ambitions, as the large majority of 
Croatian soldiers deployed abroad were serving in the NATO-led ISAF mission in Afghanistan. 
(Simunovic 2015, 194-195).  
Effects of the explaining factors in the Croatian case are shown on Table 2. 
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Table 2: Effect of the explaining factors in the Croatian case 
 
Period and 
examples 
HISTORICAL 
LEGACIES THREAT PERCEPTIONS 
INTERNAL POLITICAL 
PROCESSES INTERNATIONAL ACTORS 
1991-1995 
Considerable Decisive Decisive Discernible 
Role of YPA doctrinal 
legacy  
YPA patterns in civil-
military relations and 
party control of the AF 
War used as justi-
fication of authoritarian 
tendencies 
Internal structure of the 
army, promotion 
“Political use” of the 
armed conflict 
Authoritarian civilian 
control over the armed 
forces (AF) 
High ranking military 
officers as party 
members and candidates 
for elections 
Effects of the UN arms 
embargo 
Indirect US-Croatian 
cooperation via MPRI 
1995-1999 
Considerable Considerable Decisive Discernible 
Role of YPA doctrinal 
legacy  
YPA patterns in civil-
military relations and 
party control of the AF 
“Political use” of the 
1995 victory in the war  
Serbia still seen as a 
military threat 
Authoritarian civilian 
control over the AF 
High ranking military 
officers as party 
members and candidates 
for elections 
Only bilateral defense 
cooperation 
Role of MPRI advisory 
Unsuccessful bid to join 
NATO Partnership for 
Peace (PfP) 
2000-2003 
Discernible Discernible Decisive Considerable 
Too broad use of data 
classification („secrecy 
psychosis”) 
Few educated civilians 
on issues related to 
defense and military  
New security strategy 
based on declining 
military threats 
Skepticism of part of 
the society and army 
leadership on the 
intentions of post-
Milosevic Serbia 
Dispute on competences 
between the president 
and the defense minister 
Debate on cooperation 
with the ICTY 
“Generals letter” incident 
Participation in NATO 
Partnership for Peace (PfP) 
Adoption of new defense 
law and National Security 
Strategy in order to secure 
invitation to NATO MAP 
 
2003-2011 
Discernible Insignificant Considerable Decisive 
Social attitudes on 
NATO membership 
and American foreign 
policy 
Non-conventional 
security threats 
Consensus on the key 
issues related to NATO 
membership 
Reforms needed for 
NATO membership 
Debate on cooperation 
with the ICTY and the 
case of Gen. Gotovina 
Strategic documents reflect 
NATO requirements 
High-level personal 
contacts between Croatian 
and NATO actors 
Introduction of NATO 
defense planning system 
Increased participation in 
NATO and EU-led 
missions 
 
Source: own work 
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Based on the research questions set out in Part I. and the explaining factors mentioned in Part 
II. the main conclusions of my research can be summarized as follows:  
 
1./ The Yugoslav historical legacy did have an effect on the issues in question in both countries, 
but in Slovenia that effect was rather indirect and more limited in nature.  
The Slovenian Army was created on the basis of the Territorial Defense Force, whose internal 
structures, operation, and doctrine did influence during the 1990s the development of the 
Slovenian armed forces and civil-military relations (Malesic and Jelusic 2005, 211-212). 
Moreover, during the 1991 conflict the Slovenes did use some elements of the 1968 Yugoslav 
doctrine of “All-People’s Defense” in organizing the resistance to Yugoslav federal forces 
(Horncastle 2013). The Yugoslav historical legacy did play a role in “negative” form as well. 
In Slovenian democratization and independence processes opposition to the Yugoslav People’s 
Army (YPA) played an important role, as that force was seen as authoritarian, centralist, and 
insensitive to Slovenian national characteristics (Gow 1992, 78-88). Some solutions in the new 
Slovenian defense system were instituted to show a “clean break” with the former Yugoslav 
practice, such as the very liberal provisions on conscientious objection to military service 
(Jelusic 2002, 114-115). In the Croatian case effect of the Yugoslav historical legacy was 
stronger and more enduring than in Slovenia. Stjepan Domjančić (2015, 171-172) mentions as 
a “Croatian paradox” that the Croatian Army (HV) did fight against the YPA, or armed 
formations supported, equipped or trained by the YPA, its battlefield successes were 
nevertheless partly based on YPA doctrines and YPA provided the model in terms of its 
political control and relations to the broader society. Reneo Lukic (2008, 190-191) likewise 
points out that the patterns of civil-military relations in Titoist Yugoslavia did influence the 
forms of authoritarian or party control of the Croatian military during the Tudjman regime. 
Alex J. Bellamy (2002, 178, 2003, 193-194) mentions that, similarly to the Yugoslav case, the 
military in Tudjman’s Croatia was used by the political leadership to legitimize the state and 
the political system.  
 
2./ I did find a link between the intensity and duration of armed conflict on one hand and its 
effect on civil-military relations on the other hand. In Slovenia the experiences of the brief 
conflict did influence the development of the Slovenian Army, and field commanders of that 
conflict during the 1990s came to occupy leading positions in the Slovene armed forces, even 
though sometimes they lacked formal military education. These trends, however, did not 
influence the evolution of democratic civil-military relations. (Kotnik and Kopac 2002, 152).  
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In Croatia the longer armed conflict did intensify the authoritarian tendencies in President 
Franjo Tudjman’s leadership style present before the war (Meier 1999, 147, Ramet 2010, 259), 
and some extraordinary measures were needed in itself due to the conflict. Moreover, the war 
situation made possible, to a certain extent, the legitimization of the authoritarian modes of 
governance, and increased the role of secrecy and lack of transparency in the field of defense 
(Horowitz 2005, 161-162, Vankovska 2002, 58-59, Vankovska and Wiberg 2003, 209-210).  
In both countries the role of armed conflict as a “founding myth” of the state can be discerned: 
the “ten-day war” of Slovenia, despite its duration, served as one of early bases of legitimacy 
for the young state. (Malesic and Jelusic 2005, 211-212).  
That phenomenon was more enduring and more intense in case of Croatia and the 1991-1995 
war. According to Domjančić (2015, 171) some parallels between the YPA and the Croatian 
Army on one hand, and Tudjman’s Croatia and Titoist Yugoslavia on the other hand can also 
be observed in terms of “politics of historical memory”. In Yugoslavia during the Tito era, the 
YPA was the principal representant of the myth of WWII partisan war, as created by 
government propaganda. In Croatia, the Croatian Army, and the narrative of “Homeland War” 
(domovinski rat), as one of the “founding myths” of the state and the Tudjman regime, were 
also closely linked (Bellamy 2002, 181-182). 
3./ Authoritarian features of the Tudjman regime did fundamentally influence civil-military 
relations during the 1990s. Even though civilian control of the armed forces was never seriously 
questioned, during this period authoritarian forms of civilian control were established 
(Horowitz 2005, 162-163, Edmunds 2007, 54, Bellamy 2002, 177). Main characteristics of that 
mode were: concentration of power in hands of the president, party control of the military, 
political activities of active military personnel through formal or informal channels, existence 
of parallel chains of command, limited or minimal oversight role of the parliament, and lack of 
transparency and accountability in policy and financial matters of the security and defense 
sector. (Dolenec 2013, 133-134, 138-140, Bellamy 2002b, 176-177, 179-180). Party-political 
use of the armed forces could also be observed, such as candidacy of high-ranking officers on 
the ticket of the ruling HDZ party in parliamentary elections, in order to appeal to the patriotic 
feelings of the electorate. (Vankovska 2002, 58-59, Zunec 1996, 226). 
In Slovenia democratic control of the armed forces was successfully established from the 
beginning, nevertheless there were certain attempts by political actors to “politicize” the 
military or to “recruit” certain high ranking military figures as political allies in party-political 
controversies. Examples of such attempts could be observed during the period 1991-1994 in 
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the dispute on competences between the president and the defense minister (Malesic 2006, 146, 
Bebler 1996, 206-210).  
 
4./ I was clearly able to discern the effect of different perspectives of Euro-Atlantic integration 
in case of both countries. My research established that NATO was able to influence internal 
policy processes of the given country the most when internal political “will” to fulfil the 
conditions of NATO membership was “met” by credible membership perspective as well as 
structured and institutionalized forms of pre-accession assistance (such as the Membership 
Action Plan) from the NATO side. This was the case in Slovenia in the period 2000-2004, and 
in Croatia between 2004 and 2008.  
In these periods in both countries we can observe the formation of a “transnational coalition” 
(Epstein 2005, 69-70) comprised by local and NATO actors which helped to successfully design 
and implement reforms needed for NATO membership.   
When there was neither political will from the country concerned to fulfil the conditions of 
NATO membership (apart from declaring the intention for rapprochement to NATO), nor 
credible membership perspective offered by NATO, effect of the Atlantic alliance on policy 
areas in question was absent. I was able to observe this in case of Croatia during the 1990s in 
general, and between 1996 and 1999 in particular, as intention for rapprochement to NATO 
was first declared publicly by the Croatian President in 1996-1997 (Simunovic 2015, 192). 
Finally, when political will from the aspirant country to fulfil the conditions of membership in 
principle was present, but NATO was not able to offer a short-term credible membership 
perspective, the organization made an effect, but at a lesser extent than in the first case.  
That situation could be observed in Slovenia between 1994-1995 and 2000 on one hand, and in 
Croatia between 2000 and 2003-2004 on the other hand.  
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